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FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS: NO LONGER SO EXCEPTIONAL? 
 
TONY CHAFER 
 
 
Abstract 
Key developments in Franco-African relations since 1994 are reviewed. Reservations are 
expressed about the widely held view that these relations have undergone a process of 
normalization in recent years and that France is disengaging from its traditional pré carré 
(sphere of influence) in Black Africa. Instead, it is argued that, under pressure from a rapidly 
evolving international environment and a changing domestic policy context, a partial 
modernization of French African policy has taken place. This new global environment has 
put constraints on French African policy but has also presented France with new 
opportunities to pursue its national interests in Africa, in the context of globalization and 
international liberalism. However, certain features of the special relationship remain, such as 
the role played in Franco-African relations by the réseaux (personal networks). It is 
therefore concluded that, while a process of adaptation has indeed taken place, 
Franco-African relations are at present in a period of transition. 
 
 
 
Franco-African relations have been the subject of considerable debate in recent years, with 
much of the literature focusing on a perceived shift away from notions of French 
exceptionalism in its relations with its former Black African colonies towards conceptions of 
normalisation and even disengagement. The initial focus on exceptionalism was exemplified 
by a 1981 article in this journal entitled: ‘A certain mystery: How can France do everything that 
it does in Africa and get away with it?’, the author of which, Tamar Golan, expressed 
amazement that ‘two decades after independence, this “special relationship” [was] still alive, 
accepted by and acceptable to both France and the francophones’. Even more surprisingly, she 
suggested, other countries on the continent - notably Portugal’s former colonies - were seeking 
to get in on the act and join the club.1 Golan’s work focused on an array of institutional, 
semi-institutional and informal links constructed prior to, during and after the decolonisation 
era which underpinned and appeared to consolidate an exceptional relationship featuring 
special favours and symbolizing the mutual benefits to both France and the governing élites of 
francophone Africa of a continuing projection of French power and influence in the region. 
France gained in ‘grandeur’, thereby underpinning its claim to continue to be considered a 
world power in the post-colonial era, while African governing élites benefited from a reliable 
ally that provided economic, political, technical and - if needed - military support, in a situation 
in which their hold on power was often fragile. Against a background of extreme poverty and 
social and political divisions within the countries over which they ruled, France represented for 
them a source of stability. 
 The more recent notions of normalization have taken as their starting point two 
significant developments. Firstly, there have been important generational changes, as some of 
the leading figures in Franco-African relations have died in recent years. The death in 1993 of 
Houphouët-Boigny, who was the African doyen of the special relationship, was followed by 
the deaths of François Mitterrand in 1996, Jacques Foccart in 1997 and of the businessman, 
freemason and arch-fixer Jean-Pierre Prouteau in 1998.2 Since a feature of the Franco-African 
relationship is that it has traditionally been characterized by personal links between African 
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political leaders and members of the French governing elites, their disappearance has 
inevitably had an impact on the special nature of the Franco-African relationship.  
 Secondly, notions of normalization focus on new and perhaps more attractive areas 
competing for French attentions in the post-Cold War era, such as eastern and central Europe, 
south-east Asia and Africa. Commentators have pointed to these new settings for the projection 
of French power in a globalizing and post-Cold War world, in which Africa is increasingly 
marginalized from the more dynamic global economic, technological and political currents.3 
Growing French interest in eastern and central Europe, for example, would be consistent with 
the central role France wishes to continue to play in European construction as the EU expands 
eastwards.4 One critic of French policy has lamented this apparent loss of French interest in 
Africa: ‘Clearly, France has ceased to consider public development aid and, more generally, its 
policy of development cooperation, as a central instrument of its foreign policy’.5 At the same 
time, official government spokesmen miss no opportunity to proclaim the ‘normalization’ of 
Franco-African relations, while French ‘disengagement’ from Africa has become a leitmotif of 
articles by British and American commentators on French African policy.6 
 With these considerations in mind, the aim of this article is to examine the extent to 
which claims of ‘normalization’ and ‘disengagement’ with respect to French African policy are 
justified. Has the diminution of French ambitions and influence in Black Africa and the 
redrawing of French interests reached the point where the features of the relationship that 
traditionally made it ‘special’ are no longer actually present today? Or alternatively, have the 
recent changes in French African policy essentially been in the language in which it is couched, 
formal rather than substantive in nature, affecting the presentation of policy and the institutions 
charged with its execution rather than policy content? In other words, have the changes been 
largely cosmetic, so that the underlying reality of Franco-African relations remains 
‘exceptional’, as some have suggested?7  In order to answer these questions, major recent 
developments in French African policy will be reviewed, together with the changes in the 
international environment and the internal political pressures which led to these changes being 
made. In the light of this analysis, the question will then be asked whether a clear policy shift 
has taken place that lays the basis for a new, more ‘normal’ French relationship with Black 
Africa in the future. 
 
Franco-African relations in the post-colonial era: ‘l’exception française’ 
 France’s special relationship with Black Africa is based on two pillars: neo-colonialism 
and the projection of France overseas, the so-called ‘besoin de rayonnement’. The latter is a 
feature of French foreign policy generally and is not therefore limited to Africa.8 However, 
following the traumatic experience of French decolonization in Indochina and Algeria and the 
consequent loss of French influence in those parts of the world, the maintenance of a ‘pré 
carré’ (privileged sphere of influence) in Black Africa became central to France’s policy of 
‘rayonnement’. The origins of this special relationship thus lie in the colonial period, when 
France emerged as the major colonial power in west and central Africa, and it maintained this 
relationship into the post-colonial period to provide it with an arena for the projection of 
French power overseas. 
 The neo-colonial relationship has traditionally manifested itself at a number of different 
levels, some institutional, some not. At the institutional level, the Franc zone, which pegged the 
currency of France’s former colonies in Black Africa to the French franc at a fixed rate, and the 
Ministry of Cooperation, which emerged from the old Ministry for Overseas France and after 
independence became effectively a ministry for francophone Black Africa, had their roots in 
the colonial period. The cultural, technical and military cooperation accords which France 
concluded with its former colonies at independence were a further institutional manifestation 
 4
of this relationship, as were the frequent military interventions that resulted from them. 
Cultural cooperation served French interests by propagating the French language and culture, 
while French public development aid reinforced the ties with its African pré carré, maintained 
dependency and gave privileged access to African markets and raw materials. Just as 
important, however, were the non-institutionalized forms of the relationship, in particular the 
close personal links which had been forged between members of the French governing élites 
and African political leaders under the Fourth Republic. These links have continued into the 
post-colonial era and are exemplified by the personalized relationships that have existed 
between French presidents and African political leaders under the Fifth Republic. Moreover, 
although according to the constitution African policy is the shared responsibility of the 
president and prime minister, it has in practice formed part of the president’s ‘domaine réservé’ 
since 1958 and each president has had his own personal adviser on African affairs as part of an 
Africa ‘cell’ which operates outside the normal government channels and is not accountable 
either to the government or parliament. 
 Other links, such as the annual Franco-African summits which were initiated in 1973 at 
the instigation of the president of Niger, Hamani Diori, are difficult to classify as they lie 
somewhere between the institutional and the non-institutional. They are institutionalized to the 
extent that they bring together French and African political leaders and their officials, but 
insofar as they do not have any published agenda or make formal policy recommendations, 
they resemble more informal family gatherings than official inter-governmental meetings. 
Finally, there is what I call here the Paris-African complex, which has traditionally operated 
both through official channels and unofficial contacts - the so-called ‘réseaux’ (networks).9  
These networks have been one of the main vehicles for the clientelist relations maintained by 
France with its former African colonies in the post-colonial period. The best known of them 
was operated by Jacques Foccart, who knew most of the heads of state of the newly 
independent francophone African states personally. Other significant networks have been 
those run by the former president’s son Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the ‘freemasons’ network, 
the Elf petrol company network and that run by the former interior minister and current 
president of the Hauts-de-Seine region, Charles Pasqua. A key feature of this complex is that 
the official and unofficial links have sometimes worked in parallel and sometimes in collusion. 
For example, its activities have often been ‘covered’ by high ranking politicians or civil 
servants in Paris, or it has operated in conjunction with one of France’s secret service agencies. 
One result of this is that the public and private domains have frequently overlapped, so that the 
distinction between affairs of state and private interests has become blurred.10 
 A corollary of France’s ‘exceptional’ relationship with Black Africa is thus the 
particular configuration of the institutions and levers of French state power that was necessary 
to underpin them. However, by the early 1990s, French African policy and the political actors 
charged with its execution were attracting increasing domestic criticism. This criticism focused 
in particular on the self-serving and wasteful use of French public development aid, nearly all 
of which was tied to the purchase of over-priced French goods or the obtaining of contracts for 
French firms. Aid was also sometimes siphoned off by corrupt regimes that received French 
support purely because they were friendly to France.11 The scale and intensity of such criticism 
greatly increased after the Rwanda genocide of 1994, French implication in which focused 
unprecedented media attention on France’s African policy.  
 
Recent developments in French policy towards Africa: 1994 as a turning point 
 The year 1994 started with the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc, which had been tied 
to the French franc at a fixed rate since 1948. The devaluation must be seen alongside the 
so-called ‘Abidjan doctrine’, announced by Prime Minister Balladur in September 1993, which 
 5
stipulated that budgetary aid to Franc zone countries would henceforth be conditional upon 
these countries having previously signed an accord with the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank.12 Its effect was to align French aid policy towards Black Africa with the 
neo-liberal approach to economic policy and structural adjustment of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Taken together, these two measures sent a clear message to African political 
leaders that there would be no more special favours like the bail-outs that Paris had provided in 
the past to tide them over when the public coffers were bare at the end of the month. Since these 
special arrangements, together with the fixed CFA exchange rate with the French franc, were 
regarded by African leaders as one of the pillars of the Franco-African special relationship, the 
economic as well as symbolic significance of these measures was considerable. To appease 
African opinion, France could offer little other than short-term budgetary support to ease the 
transition. 
 Shortly after this, in April, 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus died in the Rwanda 
genocide, which was followed in July by Opération Turquoise involving the dispatch of French 
forces to the south-west of the country in what was to be the last of France’s old-style, large 
scale military interventions in Black Africa. French forces had actually been in Rwanda since 
1990, partly to protect French nationals but also to provide support for the Hutu-dominated 
government of Juvénal Habyarimana, which was coming under threat from the 
Tutsi-controlled Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Opération Turquoise was justified at the time 
by the need to create a humanitarian ‘safe zone’ for refugees from the Rwandan civil war, 
although its main consequence was to provide a safe haven and escape route into Zaire (now 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo) for many of those who had been involved in the 
genocide and were fleeing the advancing forces of the RPF. The latter, led by Rwandan exiles, 
had entered the country from Uganda and, having defeated the army of the genocidal regime of 
former president Habyarimana, were in control of most of the rest of the country by the time of 
Turquoise. French military and logistical support for Habyarimana in the run-up to the 
genocide and the consequent implication of the French government in preparations for the 
genocide focused the attention of both international and domestic opinion on French military 
intervention in Black Africa in a manner that was unprecedented.13 From political 
independence in 1960 to 1994, there had been an average of one French military intervention in 
Black Africa per year, but these now stopped. The combination of international and domestic 
criticism of the French role in Rwanda served to de-legitimize overt military intervention as an 
instrument of policy so that, when the client regime of France’s long-standing ally, President 
Mobutu, was threatened and finally overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s armed rebellion in 
neighbouring Zaire in 1996-7, France did not intervene openly, although covert support for 
Mobutu was provided in conjunction with one of France’s secret service agencies, the 
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire.14 
 The French role in Rwanda and Zaire marked an important turning-point for French 
military policy in Africa. Not only had France received a bloody nose in Rwanda, but also its 
support for the genocidal regime of Habyarimana and its support to the last of the discredited 
Mobutu had left France isolated in the international arena. By the time France finally gave up 
on Mobutu in May 1997, the US and all the other European powers, including the former 
colonial power Belgium, had abandoned him, and Nelson Mandela had taken on the role of 
mediator in an effort to avert a civil war between Mobutu’s and Kabila’s supporters. France by 
this time had become completely marginalised in Zaire. 
 It was against this background that a new policy initiative was launched, with a view to 
replacing old-style military interventions with a different type of intervention. Called 
RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), this new 
French-led peace-keeping programme aimed at enabling Africans to take greater responsibility 
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for the maintenance of security and participate more fully in peace-keeping on the continent. 
The central innovation for France is the ‘multilateralization’ of military policy, which 
comprises two elements: the ‘“Africanization” of regional security and a 
“multinationalization” of western interests exemplified by Franco-British and American-led 
initiatives to create regional peacekeeping forces’.15 This is in France’s interest for several 
reasons. It helps avoid the danger of France becoming militarily and diplomatically isolated 
and, in the case of a decision to intervene militarily, it shares the responsibilities, risks and 
financial burden of military intervention. Also, if France is to succeed in making its 
development aid more effective and in opening up new markets and investment opportunities, 
this can only happen in the context of greater political and economic instability in Africa. 
 The idea underlying the plan is that European countries such as France can help to keep 
the peace in Africa by providing training, transport and equipment for troops, whose 
deployment is coordinated by Africa’s regional organizations. The model for this was the 
French-sponsored establishment of a Mission Internationale de Surveillance des Accords de 
Bangui to keep the peace in the Central African Republic following France’s decision to 
withdraw its permanent garrison from the country in 1997.16 For Paris, this new approach has 
the advantage of maintaining influence - and lucrative arms markets - while reducing the 
attendant political risks and economic costs of unilateral military interventions. At the same 
time, the contingent of French troops permanently stationed in Africa was reduced from over 
8,000 to 5,000, although this was accompanied by measures to improve the projection 
capabilities of French forces: the aim is that France will in future be able to deploy and sustain 
up to 60,000 troops and their equipment outside Europe.17 This is linked, in turn, to French 
ideas for the creation of a European defence identity and represents a move towards a European 
or Euro-Atlantic cooperative framework for future French military actions.18 
 In another initiative which aims at a wider sharing of the responsibility, and risks, of 
involvement in Black Africa, France has declared a willingness to cooperate more closely with 
Britain in African policy. The joint Franco-British declaration on co-operation in Africa was 
launched at the Saint-Malo summit in December 1998. Noting ‘the commitment of the British 
and French governments to work together on international issues in every forum, including the 
European Union’ and ‘the special role and the responsibility which the United Kingdom and 
France . . . have in Africa, and their willingness to remain fully engaged there’, the declaration 
committed both governments to harmonize their policies towards Africa, to promote the EU 
common position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance, 
and to contribute to the stability of the continent by tackling the debt problem and maintaining 
a significant level of development assistance.19 This might seem a surprising initiative, given 
the history of competition between the two nations on the continent and the fundamentally 
different approach to Africa in Britain, which has never linked its presence in Africa to a sense 
of its global standing in the way that France consistently has since the Second World War. 
However, it may also be viewed in a different light, as representing an acceptance by both 
countries that, as medium-sized powers faced with the loss of autonomous world roles, the best 
way for middle-sized powers to continue to wield influence is through multilateralism. As with 
the RECAMP initiative, the French aim in pursuing the Franco-British initiative is to share the 
costs, and risks, of its African policy and in this way to salvage some of the specificity of the 
Franco-African relationship. However, it is important to emphasize in this context that 
Franco-British co-operation is confined largely to broad policy declarations and joint 
diplomatic initiatives, such as the visit by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and his French 
counterpart Hubert Védrine to Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in 1999. Policy co-operation in 
specific areas on the ground in Africa has been more difficult to achieve. For example, 
Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, was welcomed to Paris by President Chirac in 2001, at 
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a time when the UK was attempting to garner EU support for sanctions against his regime. 
 A further important policy change was the decision in 1998 to place the Ministry of 
Cooperation under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea of merging the 
two ministries had been aired from time to time since the 1960s and various reports had 
recommended such a merger, but nothing had been done.20 Prime Minister Alain Juppé had 
proposed such a merger in 1996 but it was blocked by President Chirac.21 Following the defeat 
of the right in the 1997 legislative elections, the Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, 
revived the idea. No longer in a position to block it completely, Chirac nonetheless refused to 
sanction the abolition of the Cooperation Ministry and its absorption by Foreign Affairs: 
‘rapprochement’ was the preferred term.22 The merger has nonetheless gone ahead and the 
decision to retain a minister for cooperation and francophonie with cabinet rank, while merging 
the staff and services of the two ministries, thus represented a political compromise. At the 
same time, the notion of ‘pays du champ’ (privileged area of action), which was rooted in the 
old notion of a pré carré and encompassed the idea that certain countries enjoyed a special 
relationship with France and had privileged access to aid, was abolished and replaced by the 
notion of a ‘zone de solidarité prioritaire’ (ZSP). Although the ZSP was based initially on the 
traditional pré carré, the number of countries covered by the zone had risen to 55 by 1998-9.23 
Since this has happened at a time when the overall French bilateral aid budget is declining year 
on year, it is inevitable that the amount of aid going to the traditional champ in Africa has 
declined substantially.24 Finally, and significantly given the French espousal of liberal 
internationalism, the Finance ministry now controls a higher proportion of the French aid 
budget than the new Foreign Affairs/Cooperation Ministry.25 Quite apart from the significant 
scale of these changes, their symbolic importance for Franco-African relations was also 
considerable, as African political leaders have traditionally regarded Cooperation as ‘their’ 
ministry. 
 The other major change in African policy since 1994 has been the reduction in the aid 
budget, which has declined from 47 billion francs (0.64 per cent of GDP) in 1994 to 33.8 
billion (0.37 per cent of GDP) in 2000. If French aid to its overseas departments and territories 
is excluded from the figures, this further reduces the 2000 aid budget to 28.9 billion francs 
(0.32 per cent of GDP). As Daniel Bourmaud has remarked: ‘The relative French exception 
that distinguished France from other comparable powers such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom in the field of public development aid seems to have passed’. Moreover, the Fonds 
Spécial de Développement, which was set up to mitigate the social effects of the devaluation of 
the CFA franc, has been renamed the Fonds Social de Développement and can now be used to 
help countries outside the Franc zone, and the proportion of the aid budget devoted to bilateral 
aid, of which the African pré carré has traditionally been the main beneficiary, declined from 
75.6 per cent of the total aid budget in 1994, to 64.7 per cent in 2000.26 Overall, an increasing 
proportion of French aid is multilateral, with the European aid budget a key beneficiary: for 
example, the French contribution to the European Development Fund rose from 4.6 billion 
francs in 1998 to 8.9 billion in 2000.  
 
The changing international environment in the 1990s 
 Changes in the international strategic environment increased external pressures for 
changes to French African policy during the 1990s. The end of the Cold War was the first of 
these. French African policy after the Second World War was driven more by national 
concerns with ‘grandeur’ and the projection of French power overseas than by Cold War 
imperatives. The Cold War was nonetheless a crucial part of the backcloth against which 
French African policy was played out, as it afforded France a strategic ‘space’ on the world 
stage in which it could pursue its national foreign policy goals while remaining part of the 
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Atlantic alliance. As a member of the latter, it was able to portray itself as the guarantor of 
Western interests in west and central Africa, while projecting an image of itself to African 
governments as an ‘honest broker’ and champion of their interests in an international arena 
dominated by Cold War concerns. With the end of the Cold War and the consequent decline in 
the strategic importance of Black Africa, this opportunity was closed and France now had to 
define its African policy in the context of a new world order dominated by the US as the sole 
remaining superpower. Through its position in the Bretton Woods institutions, the US has been 
able broadly to dictate the international policy agenda for Africa, for example with respect to 
macro-economic policy and economic and political conditionality, with the result that it has 
exerted considerable, and growing, influence over African countries that were previously part 
of France’s exclusive pré carré. The US also took the diplomatic initiative in brokering 
settlements of a number of African conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s, for example between 
Angola and Namibia and between the government and UNITA rebels in Angola.27 France has 
had no choice but to adapt its African policy to this new situation. 
 Secondly, in the era of colonial empires, power was centred on the nation-state and 
linked to territorial control and military strength. This continued to be the case well into the 
post-colonial era in francophone Black Africa, where French military interventions showed 
that France continued to see itself as ‘the guarantor of stability and a hegemonic power’ in the 
region.28 However, the accelerating process of economic globalization during the 1990s has 
meant that global influence is increasingly linked to economic, financial and commercial 
power and technological advance. In this context, the economic marginalization of Africa, 
which generates a declining share of world output and where GDP per capita has declined since 
the 1970s, combined with its strategic marginalization,29 has inevitably had an impact on 
French perceptions of its involvement in the continent: if Africa is economically and 
strategically marginalized, the political benefits to France of playing a high profile role there 
are also reduced. 
 Changes in Africa in the 1990s have also put pressure on France to revise its African 
policy. The debt crisis, economic failure, increased political instability, a series of intra- and 
inter-state conflicts and the humanitarian crises that have ensued from these, have rendered 
involvement in the continent more problematic and, potentially, more costly in both economic 
and political terms. The transition to multi-partyism in francophone Africa after the end of the 
Cold War brought new political leaders to power, but in the process increased political tensions 
and rivalries.30 This happened for example in Benin, Mali and Congo-Brazzaville, and later in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, while in other countries, such as Rwanda and Zaire, the result was 
state collapse. France had no choice but to come to terms with these new leaders and, in those 
cases where the old regimes collapsed, with entirely new political systems. In most cases, these 
political transitions led to increased political and sometimes ethnic tensions, as in Côte 
d’Ivoire, while in others such as Zaire and the Congo it led to armed conflict. In this context, 
France’s traditional ‘clientelist’ relations with favoured African political leaders and governing 
élites - the so-called ‘interlocuteurs valables’ - ran the risk of France becoming too closely 
identified with the losing side in the case of a change of regime or government. This was not 
the only problem, however. African states’ inability to control or contain these new conflicts 
posed a threat not only to their own internal security but also, if they crossed borders into 
neighbouring states, to the security of those states as well. France, which was bound to many of 
the states concerned by bilateral defence and military cooperation agreements, thus risked 
becoming involved in multiple and escalating conflicts which it was unlikely to be able to 
resolve.31 Events in Rwanda and former Zaire in 1994-7 were a dramatic illustration of this. 
 European integration and closer cooperation with NATO have made it more difficult 
for France to play a distinctive, ‘exceptional’ role in foreign policy. Deepening European 
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economic and political integration and a rapprochement with NATO have led to increasing 
French involvement in multilateral institutions and therefore less possibility of pursuing an 
independent line in foreign policy. France has actively promoted, and remains committed to, 
further European integration; it is part of the European monetary union (EMU) and adopted the 
euro as its currency in 2002. European integration and economic globalization have forced 
governments to espouse the values of economic and political liberalism. Maintaining 
competitiveness and meeting the criteria for membership of the EMU means keeping public 
expenditure low by reducing business costs and lowering personal taxes. This in turn puts 
pressure on governments to reduce their g16 
development aid budgets, or at least to maintain them at a level comparable to those of their 
competitors, and represents a further constraint on the pursuit of ‘independent’, national 
economic and foreign policies. Not only does this make it more difficult for France to maintain 
an exclusive pré carré in Africa, it also means that the potential economic and political benefits 
to France of pursuing such a policy are much reduced. Against the background of recurring 
economic crises and political instability, the potential gains to France in terms of international 
prestige and an enhanced profile in the global arena from the projection of French power in 
Black Africa are likely to be outweighed by the economic costs and political risks incurred, as 
the French experience in Rwanda demonstrated. 
 Finally, France wants the EU to play a more significant and coherent role, both 
politically and militarily, in the international arena. At the same time, new threats to European 
security, notably in the Balkans, and concerns that Germany might increasingly turn its 
attentions eastwards following German unification have led France to seek a closer 
relationship with NATO.32 The inevitable result of this is to limit its freedom of manoeuvre as 
an independent foreign policy actor pursuing its national interests through exclusive, bilateral 
relations with a small number of favoured client states. Indeed, in an increasingly 
multi-centred, interdependent world, in which the freedom of nation-states to act 
independently is increasingly circumscribed, such a policy, based on the notion of an exclusive 
sphere of influence, appears more and more anachronistic. 
 
The domestic policy context 
 External pressures, however strong they may appear, are not necessarily sufficient in 
themselves to bring about a shift in policy. Indeed the initial reaction of policy makers and 
officials, when confronted with such pressures, may well be a defensive one.33 They may adjust 
their political discourse while seeking in practice to maintain as much as possible of the status 
quo, particularly if they have some vested interest in its maintenance. This is especially 
pertinent to an analysis of French African policy because of the way in which personal interests 
and loyalties have traditionally interlocked with interests of state in Franco-African relations. 
For a policy shift to occur, the pressures described above need to impinge on the domestic 
polity in a pressing way. Short of a serious crisis that poses an immediate threat to national 
security interests, this means that the need for a policy change has to rise up the domestic 
political agenda, for example through sustained lobbying from civil society and coverage in the 
national media, which is then mediated via the political opposition, and that the configuration 
and relative strength of the different political actors involved in the policy making process has 
to change as a result. This section will examine the extent to which these conditions for a shift 
in French African policy have been met. 
 Firstly, economic constraints were an increasingly important consideration. The 
over-valued exchange rate between the CFA and French franc meant that the cost of providing 
budgetary support to African countries was rising. Moreover, the need for such support was 
likely to grow as the primary products on which Franc zone countries depended for the lion’s 
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share of their export earnings became increasingly uncompetitive in the world market. 
However, it was only the combination of these economic considerations with a fortuitous 
combination of political circumstances that brought about an actual policy shift in this area. 
Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993: president of Côte d’Ivoire since political 
independence and doyen of Franco-African relations, he had long resisted devaluation of the 
CFA franc.34 His health failing, President Mitterrand was in the twilight of his political career 
and, following the defeat of the left in the 1993 legislative elections, was taking a less proactive 
role in policy making. Finally, and crucially, the defeat in the legislative elections had ushered 
in a second period of ‘cohabitation’ between a Socialist president and a right-wing prime 
minister. 
 According to the Constitution, responsibility for foreign and defence policy is shared 
between the president and prime minister, although the exact nature of their respective roles is 
not made clear. The new prime minister, Edouard Balladur, who was an economic liberal with 
no particular attachments to, or interest in, Africa, did not share in the mind-set of other Fifth 
Republic political leaders who conceived of French African policy above all as a political 
instrument for the projection of French power overseas. His intervention was decisive in 
pushing France to adopt the ‘Abidjan doctrine’. From his perspective, the African link brought 
no clear, substantial economic benefit to France and, since he did not share in its symbolic 
value as a pillar of the Franco-African special relationship, there was no rationale for retaining 
the fixed parity with the French franc. The significance of this change was that external 
pressures were mediated internally by the arrival of a new political actor with the power and 
will to make changes. In contrast, a few months later, when the Rwanda tragedy began to 
unfold, Balladur maintained a low profile, preferring to leave the initiative to the president and 
the interior minister, Charles Pasqua. This can be explained by the influence wielded over the 
president by his son and special advisor on African affairs, Jean-Christophe, who had close 
links with Habyarimana and the old Rwandan governing élite, and the power of Pasqua’s 
‘Corsican network’ in sub-Saharan Africa, with its links to the secret services and the Elf petrol 
company.35 
 A further political reconfiguration of the personnel overseeing African policy took 
place in 1995, with the election of Jacques Chirac to the presidency and the appointment of 
Alain Juppé as prime minister. In the context of the Franco-African special relationship, the 
former is usually seen as a representative of the old guard: ‘Jacques Chirac belongs to the 
galaxy of “Africans”, that is to say those who, in the French political class, identify themselves 
with that distinctively Franco-African relationship that has developed since the beginning of 
the Fifth Republic’.36 Juppé on the other hand was a reformer: he had been foreign minister in 
the Balladur government of 1993-5; like the prime minister he had no special attachment to 
Africa and was opposed to the personalized, clientelist nature of the Franco-African 
relationship; and he was in favour of the ‘normalization’ of Franco-African relations. 
However, his key proposal in this regard, for the abolition of the Ministry of Cooperation, was 
blocked by the president and its implementation had to await a further reconfiguration at the 
apex of the French state, with the election of Lionel Jospin as prime minister in 1997. Another 
reformer with no particular stake in the Franco-African relationship, Jospin took advantage of 
the weakened position of the president following the defeat of the right in the legislative 
elections of that year to push through the reform that Juppé had wanted. 
 Internal pressure for reform has also come from another, perhaps unexpected, quarter 
within the French political establishment. It is true that there have been contradictory signs 
here, as French military interventions since 1994 - and indeed decisions not to intervene - can 
be interpreted as attempts by France to maintain stability and influence in its traditional pré 
carré. The intervention in the Central African Republic in 1996-7 and the non-intervention in 
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Congo, which allowed Chirac’s friend and long-standing ally of ‘la Françafrique’, Denis 
Sassou Nguesso, to return to power in 1997, appear to indicate the continuation of France’s 
long-standing policy of grandeur and the maintenance of stability in its pré carré through 
military intervention.37 On the other hand, there has been no new military intervention on the 
scale of Opération Turquoise, which mobilized 2500 men in 1994, and there has been a 
reduction in the French military presence in Africa, with one of its six permanent military bases 
(Bangui) being closed completely while the other five have been reduced in size.38 Several 
factors have played a role here. International criticism of the French military role in Rwanda 
has undoubtedly been a consideration.39 In an increasingly unstable political situation, the large 
military presence, especially in major urban centres which are often the focus for political 
protest, carries the risk of the French military being drawn into conflicts which it cannot 
resolve. In this context, the succession of mutinies by soldiers of the Central African army from 
April 1996 onwards was the key factor in the decision to withdraw from Bangui.40 
Furthermore, some African states have become more critical of what they see as an 
increasingly anachronistic military presence, so that the political returns France can expect to 
obtain from its interventions in Africa are reduced. Thus, although budgetary considerations 
have been given as the main reason for the reduced military presence, strategic and military 
considerations have also played a role. 
 However, French African policy cannot be judged simply by its official manifestations. 
Smith and Glaser have documented how France’s military networks operating in support of 
favoured African clients have remained active and how they continue to be driven by the 
so-called Fashoda syndrome.41 More recently, arms sales have been organized to several 
countries, including Angola, and mercenaries have been recruited for Congo-Brazzaville, 
apparently through the good offices of Alfred Sirven, Elf’s financial director.42 
 Nonetheless, the increased ‘visibility’ of Franco-African relations since 1994 has 
created complications for the Paris-African complex. Public awareness of the corrupt practices 
that have been a feature of French African policy has increased: Stephen Smith’s articles in 
Libération, Patrick de Saint-Exupéry’s in Le Figaro, revelations contained in the parliamentary 
commission of enquiry on French involvement in Rwanda, which have been reproduced 
widely in the media, and Philippe Lemayrie’s articles in Le Monde diplomatique, have given 
African policy higher political prominence within France. Moreover, NGOs, which have 
traditionally played a much less prominent role in France with respect to African policy than 
their counterparts in Britain, have become more active since 1994: the work of Agir ici, Survie 
and the Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération Française have played an important role in 
this respect. 
 Most important in terms of putting pressure on the Paris-African complex has been the 
succession of legal investigations into the affairs of prominent figures in France’s various 
African networks: former cooperation minister Michel Roussin, former interior minister 
Charles Pasqua, former presidential adviser to his father on African affairs, Jean-Christophe 
Mitterrand, and directors of the Elf petrol company have all come under investigation. Roussin 
and Mitterrand spent several nights in gaol before being bailed and Alfred Sirven, Elf’s director 
of finance in the 1980s and 1990s and recently extradited with some difficulty from the 
Philippines, remains in detention.43 Roussin, who is also a former colonel in one of France’s 
secret service agencies, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Etrangère, is currently head of the 
employers’ federation Africa committee and a vice-president of Bolloré, a vast holding 
company run by Vincent Bolloré with extensive interests in Africa in transport, ports, tobacco, 
wood, cocoa, rubber and cotton.44 He was a close aide to Jacques Chirac as mayor of Paris in 
the 1980s and early 1990s and has played a key role in fund-raising for his party, the 
neo-Gaullist Rassemblement pour la République. These activities are now under investigation. 
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As for Mitterrand junior, he has been linked, together with Charles Pasqua, to money 
laundering activities and illegal arms sales to Angola.45 These investigations, together with the 
much-publicized failed lawsuit for ‘offence to a foreign head of state’ brought against 
François-Xavier Verschave by three African heads of state, have placed French African policy 
and the illicit activities of France’s African networks under the media spotlight.46  
 
Towards a new African strategy? 
 We have seen above that there have been significant changes in Franco-African 
relations since the mid-1990s, in response to growing international and domestic pressures. 
Demands for a change in policy were not in fact new. A series of reports since the 1960s had 
advocated a new approach to Franco-African relations.47 However, the first significant sign 
that French African policy might be about to change came in 1990 at the La Baule 
Franco-African summit when, with the tide of democracy unfurling over east and central 
Europe, President Mitterrand announced that French aid would henceforth be linked to 
democratization.48 Shortly afterwards, the government also promised debt reduction to 
middle-income countries engaged in the democratization process.49 However, although France 
suspended development aid to Zaire (1991) and Togo (1993) and provided logistical support 
for elections in Benin (1990), the Central African Republic (1992) and Niger (1993), it rapidly 
became clear that France was backtracking on its commitment to democratization. Not only did 
President Mitterrand announce at the 1991 Francophonie summit that each country should ‘set 
the terms and pace of its own reform’, it also became clear that France was not prepared to 
reward countries engaged in the democratization process at the expense of traditional allies 
who were not. For example, Benin, which democratized, saw its aid reduced from 580 million 
francs in 1989 to 300 million in 1990, while Togo, which remained an authoritarian regime, 
received more aid in 1990 (923 million francs) than it had the previous year (628 million).50 
Because of the traditionally pre-eminent role that the president plays in French African policy, 
the La Baule announcement did seem to presage a change of direction for Franco-African 
relations. However, the balance sheet of the new policy of ‘Paristroika’, as it was dubbed at the 
time, was at best mixed: since 1992, French ‘aid to institutional development’, as it is called, 
has in practice given priority to security concerns and the re-establishment of the authority of 
the state over democratization.51 
 At the same time, economic pressures on French African policy were growing. The 
‘strong franc’ policy, which involved pegging the exchange rate to the German mark, the 
devaluation of the dollar in the mid-1980s, deteriorating terms of trade between the Franc zone 
and the rest of the world, the worsening economic crisis in Africa and the growing cost of 
bailing out bankrupt former colonies, forced France to devalue the CFA franc in 1994, leading 
to what some commentators have described as a normalization of policy.52 However, another 
way of interpreting this policy shift is as a move by ‘modernizers’ in Paris to reduce the 
financial cost of its African policy so as to enable France better to remain.53 In this respect, 
while the devaluation represents an essential adaptation to new realities, it does not necessarily 
have to be seen as representing a move towards the ‘normalization’ of Franco-African 
relations. Rather, it can be interpreted as representing a compromise that enabled France to 
embrace new realities while preserving as much as possible of the ‘old’ order of things. 
 Other policy initiatives in the 1990s can be viewed in a similar light. The half-hearted 
embracing of political conditionality after La Baule, followed by the whole-hearted adoption of 
economic conditionality under the ‘Abidjan doctrine’, the RECAMP initiative, the reform of 
the Cooperation ministry, the channelling of an increasing proportion of French aid through the 
European Union and the Saint-Malo declaration, can all be seen at one level as part of a move 
away from the old policy of the pré carré and thus as part of a process of normalization. On the 
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other hand, they can be seen as elements of a wider move towards multilateralism in French 
African policy, the aim of which is to share the costs, risks and responsibilities of its African 
presence and involvement. A recent example of this risk-sharing was the joint mission by the 
French foreign affairs minister, Hubert Védrine, and the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, 
to the Great Lakes region in January 2002.54 One advantage for France of pursuing this 
approach is that it frees France’s hand to pursue its special relationship with favoured clients 
such as Gabon, Cameroun, Burkina Faso and Togo, thereby enabling it to preserve something 
of the Franco-African special relationship. It is an approach that offers something to both the 
‘traditionalists’ and the ‘modernizers’ in Franco-African relations. 
 Moreover, government spokesmen have sent out mixed signals since the mid-1990s. 
For example, the Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, declared on the one hand that he wanted ‘not 
to do less but to do better’ in Africa, while on the other he claimed, in his speech to the South 
African parliament in May 2001, that he wanted to put an end to the special relationship 
between France and its traditional pré carré and open up France’s African policy to the whole 
of the continent.55 At the same time, the foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, is said to have little 
interest in Africa and it seems that the present government does not have the political will to 
pursue an energetic African policy.56 
 This lack of a specific vision of Franco-African relations, together with the new official 
discourse of ‘normalization’, can be seen as serving the interests of the Paris-African complex 
insofar as one of its consequences is to distract attention from the continuing specificities of the 
Franco-African relationship. The réseaux have not disappeared and in some areas appear to be 
as active as ever, although they are not necessarily associated with the pursuit of the interests of 
the state in the same way as they were in the past. In fact, Smith and Glaser have suggested that 
the réseaux have fragmented, become ‘privatized’ and have transformed themselves into 
private ‘lobbies that pursue their own objectives, whether or not these objectives implicate the 
state’.57 They also continue to operate with the connivance of France’s secret service agencies 
and the president’s Africa cell, and have been able to mobilize substantial financial, diplomatic 
and military resources in support of their objectives. Moreover, French companies continue to 
make a good profit from the import-export trade and French business has done well out of the 
privatization of formerly state-controlled marketing boards and public services in francophone 
Black Africa.58  Many of these companies are well linked with the Paris-African complex, 
which in this way has found a new means of exercising its influence. In a new world order that 
is dominated by the ideology of international liberalism, is less state-centred and in which 
economic, financial and commercial clout have assumed increased importance in the exercise 
of global power, this may well be an effective way of maintaining French influence in Africa. 
Indeed, the strength of this new approach may well lie precisely in its combination of these 
‘modern’ power forms with old-style political and military support in Paris. 
 However, an alternative interpretation is to suggest that the disappearance of the 
Cooperation ministry and the move to distribute French bilateral aid outside the traditional 
champ mark the end of the old-style neo-colonial relationship. It can be argued that these 
changes, together with the fragmentation of the réseaux and the other developments outlined 
above, have reduced the Paris-African complex’s direct political influence over African policy. 
In cutting the ground from under the Paris-African complex, which largely relied on French 
bilateral aid for its survival, these changes can be seen as indicative of a clear shift in French 
African policy. The besoin de rayonnement is still there, and is reflected in continuing efforts 
in Paris to project French language and culture through La Francophonie and to ‘marquer la 
différence’ in the international arena, but the new international environment makes this much 
more difficult than in the past. 
 For the moment, it appears that the Jospin government decided that the political risks of 
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challenging these lobbies and the complex of interests which they represent are outweighed by 
any likely political advantage that the government might gain from such a challenge. In a 
political context of ‘cohabitation’, such a challenge would have been fraught with danger. If 
Jacques Chirac had lost the 2002 presidential election, this situation could have changed and 
the Paris-African complex may well have found official diplomatic and military support for its 
projects less forthcoming. However, even Chirac is not an unconditional supporter of ‘la 
Françafrique’. Although the principal actors of the Paris-African complex continue to consider 
him as one of ‘theirs’, Daniel Bourmaud has pointed out that his stance on African policy is 
actually pragmatic and deliberately ambiguous, as he has hitherto backed both ‘traditionalists’ 
and ‘modernizers’ in French African policy.59 For the time being, therefore, it appears safest to 
conclude that Franco-African relations are in a period of transition: there has been a process of 
normalization, but France has not disengaged. To be sure, the relationship is not as distinctive 
as it was in the past, but it continues to contain some residual special features that can hardly be 
described as ‘normal’. 
 
Tony Chafer is Professor of Contemporary French Area Studies at the University of 
Portsmouth (UK). He has written widely on Franco-African relations in the colonial and 
post-colonial period and is the author of The End of Empire in French West Africa. France’s 
Successful Decolonization? (Berg, 2002). 
 
 
 
Notes and references 
 
The author wishes to thank Paul McVeigh and Richard Moncrieff for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. 
 
                                                          
1. T. Golan, in African Affairs 80 (1981), p. 3. 
2. For a profile of the latter, see S. Smith and A. Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique. Le 
Paris-village du continent noir (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1992), pp. 9-27. 
3. W. Kühne, ‘The changing international environment of African politics’, in S. Brüne, J. Betz 
and W. Kühne, eds., Africa and Europe: Relations of Two Continents in Transition (Hamburg, 
Lit Verlag, 1994), pp. 1-19. 
4. It is worth noting, however, that reports of French economic interest in Africa declining as 
French trade with, and investment in, east and central Europe have grown, appear exaggerated, 
see C. Gulvin, ‘The French economy and the end of the Cold War’, in T. Chafer and B. Jenkins, 
eds., France. From the Cold War to the New World Order (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996), pp. 
115-25. 
5. D. Bourmaud, ‘L’aide publique au développement en 1998: les moyens de la fin?’ in 
Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération Française (OPCF), Rapport 1998 (Paris, Karthala, 
1998), p. 22. 
6. For example, Charles Josselin, Minister for Cooperation, stated in a recent interview that: 
‘The decision to make the Foreign Affairs ministry responsible for the administration of French 
 15
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cooperation policy aimed to put an end to “la Françafrique”, Ouest-France, 15 January 2001, 
quoted in Billets d’Afrique 89 (2001), p. 5. Recent articles in the English language press that 
take up the theme of normalization include ‘France’s fading affair with Africa’, The 
Economist, 22 April 1989, pp. 67-8; ‘Paris will demote its ties with African backyard’, 
International Herald Tribune, 7 February 1998. Cf. also J. Derrick, ‘Generally, one can say 
that today francophone states’ ties with France are no longer distinctive, no longer a cause for 
suspicion among other African states as they were before’, in ‘French and African culture’, 
West Africa, 8-14 October 2001, p. 18. 
7. X. Renou, ‘A new French policy for Africa?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20,  
1 (2002), p. 24. 
8. Cf. P. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur: ideological aspects of De Gaulle’s foreign policy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
9. Steven Smith and Antoine Glaser define a ‘réseau’ as follows: ‘An informal, indeed secret, 
association of individuals, some of whom are civil servants, who pursue common objectives, 
the realization of which implicates the State and, ultimately, the Nation or some other high 
idea’, in Ces Messieurs Afrique 2. Des réseaux aux lobbys (Calmann-Lévy, 1997), p. 25. 
10.  The réseaux and their leading figures are documented in Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs 
Afrique and Ces Messieurs Afrique 2. It is worth noting here that these different networks 
frequently overlap but are also often in competition with each other. 
11. C. Freud, Quelle coopération? Un bilan de l’aide au développement Karthala, 1988); J. 
Adda and M.-C. Smouts, La France face au sud. Le miroir brisé (Paris, Karthala, 1989) and S. 
Brunel, Le Gaspillage de l’aide publique (Paris, Seuil, 1993). See also G. Cumming, 
‘Modernisation without “banalisation”: towards a new era in French African aid relations?’, 
Modern and Contemporary France 8, 3 (2000), pp. 360-1. 
12. Edouard Balladur’s letter to Franc zone heads of state laying out the new policy was 
published in Le Monde, 23 September 1993. 
13. Cf. P. de Saint-Exupéry’s series of articles, ‘Quatre ans après le génocide rwandais’, in Le 
Figaro, 30 March-7 April 1998. See also Agir ici/Survie, Les Dossiers noirs de la politique 
africaine de la France, no. 1 à 5 (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995), pp. 16-18 and report by the 
Mission d’information parlementaire sur le rôle joué par la France au Rwanda de 1990 à 1994, 
summarized in Le Monde, 17 December 1998. 
14. The Foccart and Pasqua networks were able to mobilize substantial financial resources to 
promote the rehabilitation of the Mobutu regime in the US and organized arms sales and the 
dispatch of mercenaries to support Mobutu’s failing regime, see Smith and Glaser, Ces 
Messieurs Afrique 2, pp. 49-52 and F.-X. Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale 
de la République (Paris, Stock, 1998), pp. 255-65. 
15. S. Gregory, ‘The French military in Africa: past and present’, African Affairs 99 (2000), p. 
 16
                                                                                                                                                                                    
442. 
16. ‘The new foreign legion’, Africa Confidential, 18 May 2001, p. 1. 
17. Gregory, ‘The French military in Africa’, pp. 447-8. 
18. J. Bryant, ‘Changing circumstances, changing policies? The 1994 Defence White Paper 
and beyond’, in T. Chafer and B. Jenkins, eds., France, pp. 85-6; R. Utley, ‘“Not to do less but 
do better...” French military policy in Africa’, International Affairs 78, 1 (2002), p. 134. 
19. Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefing paper, Saint-Malo summit, 3-4 December 
1998. 
20. For example in March 1974 the Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, announced that the 
Ministry of Cooperation would be abolished and its services merged with the Foreign Ministry. 
However, on winning the presidential election two months later, Giscard d’Estaing overturned 
the proposal and reinstated a full Ministry of Cooperation, see J. Chipman, French Power in 
Africa (Oxford, Blackwell, 1989), p. 200. 
21. Refusing to ‘banaliser’ French African policy, Chirac had actually announced at the 1995  
Francophone summit in Cotonou that the Cooperation Ministry would retain its independence, 
Le Monde, 3-4 December 1995. 
22. C. Wauthier, in ‘La coopération entre ravalement et réforme’, Le Monde diplomatique, 
March 1998, p. 21.  
23. G. Cumming, Aid to Africa. French and British policies from the Cold War to the New 
Millennium (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001), p. 409. 
24. D. Bourmaud, ‘L’aide publique au développement en 2000. Le syndrome du 
dédoublement’, OPCF, Rapport 2000 (Paris, Karthala, 2000), pp. 26-7. 
25. Ibid., p. 23. 
26. Ibid, pp. 20-1. For a commentary on the downward trend in the French aid budget, see also 
http://www.senat.fr: ‘Projet de loi de finances pour 2002 - Tome III: Aide au développement’ 
and ‘Projet de loi de finances pour 2001, adopté par l'Assemblée nationale - Tome IV, Analyse 
synthétique’ [accessed 27 March 2002]. 
27. D. Rothchild, ‘The United States and Conflict Management in Africa’, in J. W. Harbeson 
and D. Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1995), 
pp. 222-6 and Rothchild, ‘The Impact of US Disengagement’, in  Harbeson and Rothchild, 
eds., Africa in World Politics, 3rd ed. (2000), pp. 171-4. 
 17
                                                                                                                                                                                    
28. S. Brüne, ‘Under Pressure for Reform: French Policies South of the Sahara’, in Brüne, 
Betz, and Kühne, eds., Africa and Europe, p. 56. 
29. T. M. Callaghy, ‘Africa and the World Political Economy: More Caught Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place’, in Harbeson and Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics, 3rd ed., p. 44. 
30. Cf. C. Fomunyoh, ‘Democratisation in fits and starts’, Journal of Democracy, 12, 3 (2001), 
pp. 37-50. 
31. J.-F. Bayart, ‘Fin de partie au sud du Sahara. La politique africaine de la France’, p. 120, in 
S. Michailof, La France et l’Afrique. Vade-mecum pour un nouveau voyage (Paris, Karthala, 
1993). 
32. J. Bryant, ‘France and NATO from 1966 to Kosovo: Coming Full Circle?’, European 
Security, 9, 3, 2000, pp. 26-7; A. Menon, ‘From independence to cooperation: France, NATO 
and European Security’, International Affairs, 71, 1 (1995), pp. 25-32. 
33. For a discussion of the ways in which changes in the international environment feed 
through into policy, see Cumming, Aid to Africa, chapter 6. 
34. P. Lemayrie, ‘Monnaie dévaluée, peuples oubliés’, Le Monde diplomatique, March 1994, 
p. 24. 
35. Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, pp. 205-31. 
36. D. Bourmaud, ‘La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac: les anciens contre les modernes’, 
Modern and Contemporary France, NS4, 4, 1996, p. 435. See also Agir Ici-Survie,  Dossiers 
noirs de la politique africaine de la France, no. 6: Jacques Chirac et la Françafrique (Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 1995). 
37. The term ‘la Françafrique’ was originally coined by Ivoirian president Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny to describe the special nature of the Franco-African relationship. In its 
modern sense, referring to the illicit and often corrupt nature of Franco-African relations, it was 
first used in the newsletter Billets d’Afrique, no.5, in 1994, and has since been used in the title 
of two works by François-Xavier Verschave to describe what I call in this article the 
Paris-African complex. The works are La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la 
République (Paris, Stock, 1998) and Noir Silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique? (Paris, Eds. 
Les Arènes, 2000). 
38. ‘La France remanie son dispositif militaire en Afrique’ and ‘La France fermera 
progressivement ses bases en Centrafrique’, Le Monde, 21 July and 2 August 1997. 
 18
                                                                                                                                                                                    
39. ‘Hunting lobby’, Africa Confidential, 27 July 2001, p. 6. 
40. Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, pp. 88-9. 
41. Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, pp. 65-93. The ‘Fashoda syndrome’ refers to a 
military stand-off between British and French forces in Sudan in 1898, which resulted in the 
withdrawal of the latter. The term is used today to refer to French fear of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
threat to its African pré carré. 
42. Billets d’Afrique 88 (supplement) (2001), pp. 2-3; 91 (2001), p. 6, and F.-X. Verschave, 
Noir Silence, pp. 33-5. 
43. ‘Presidential pranks’, Africa Confidential, 8 December 2000, p. 8 and ‘Oil slick’, Africa 
Confidential, 21 December 2001, p. 8. 
44. See Agir ici-Survie, Dossiers noirs, no. 15. Bolloré: Monopoles, services compris (Paris, 
L’Harmattan, 2000); F.-X. Verschave, Noir Silence, pp. 396-403. 
45. ‘Presidential pranks’, p. 8. 
46. The court case is related in full in F.-X. Verschave and L. Beccaria, Noir Procès. Offense à 
chefs d’état (Paris, Eds. Les Arènes, 2001). 
47. Cf. the Jeanneney (1964), Gorse (1971), Abelin (1975) and Hessel (1990) reports. 
48. ‘M. Mitterrand lie l’octroi de l’aide française aux efforts de démocratisation’, Le Monde, 22 
June 1990. 
49. G. Cumming, ‘French Development assistance to Africa: Towards a new agenda?’, African 
Affairs 94 (1995), p. 390. 
50. G. Cumming, ‘French aid to Africa: towards a new consensus?’, Modern and 
Contemporary France, NS4, 4 (1996), pp. 454-5. 
51. R. Banégas and P. Quantin, ‘Orientation and limitations of French aid for democratic 
development - Benin, Congo and the Central African republic’, special issue of Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies (1996), pp. 113-33. 
52. B. Hibou, ‘Politique économique de la France en zone franc’, Politique africaine 58 (1995), 
p. 36. 
53. Bourmaud, ‘La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac’, pp. 439-40. 
 19
                                                                                                                                                                                    
54. ‘UK and France join forces for African mission’, The Guardian, 2 January 2002, p. 5. 
55. ‘Allocution du Premier ministre devant la communauté française à Dakar (Sénégal)’, 19 
December 1997, www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d20/5_3.htm and ‘Discours devant le 
Parlement sud-africain’, 31 May 2001, www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr [accessed 27 March 
2002]. 
56. ‘Hunting lobby’, p. 6. 
57. Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, p. 25. 
58. Smith and Glaser, Ces Messieurs Afrique 2, pp. 133-51 and F.-X. Verschave, Noir Silence, 
pp. 263-71. 
59. Bourmaud, ‘La politique africaine de Jacques Chirac’, p. 435-6. 
